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Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans 
buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition 
parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 
617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments 
(Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral 
contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able 
to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and 
unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and 
local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the 
average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that 
grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition 
parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from 
intergovernmental grants as the grantor.  
JEL Code: D72, H73. 
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In recent years, there has been a surge in the empirical literature that seeks to explain the 
political motives determining the allocation of intergovernmental grants and other public 
spending programs. For example, adopting the line taken by the theoretical studies of Lindbeck 
& Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan (1998), the research undertaken by Case (2001), 
Strömberg (2007), Johansson (2003) and Dahlberg & Johansson (2004) provides some 
empirical evidence to suggest that more grants are allocated to jurisdictions in which the 
electors have been shown to be relatively indifferent to the incumbent and the challenger (i.e., 
there is a high proportion of ‘swing voters’). Some of these papers have sought to contrast this 
hypothesis with an alternative theory (derived from Cox & McCubbins, 1986) that claims that – 
if politicians are risk averse – funds will be allocated to those jurisdictions in which voters are 
clearly attached to the incumbent party (the ‘core supporters’). The results in Dahlberg & 
Johansson (2004) and Castells & Solé-Ollé (2005) suggest that the evidence in favour of this 
hypothesis is rather weak, although, as Rodden & Wilkinson (2004) point out, the task of 
separating the ‘swing voter’ and ‘core supporter’ hypotheses is not easy.  
 
However, this literature misses a fundamental point, which is especially important when dealing 
with intergovernmental transfers. The models used to date assume that the grantor government 
is able to get all the political credit arising from the allocation of a grant to a given jurisdiction. 
However, it often happens that the grant is allocated by the upper layer of government, but the 
project funded is implemented by the local government, who in this way can stand before the 
citizens as the main responsible for the expenditure. This is clearly not a problem for the grantor 
if the local government belongs to the same party, but it can have adverse consequences when 
there is no partisan alignment, since the grants sent to a jurisdiction to improve electoral 
chances can actually improve those of the opposition. This argument has recently been proposed 
by Arulampalam et al. (2008) and Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), who use it to obtain 
the theoretical prediction that grantors will allocate more grants to aligned local governments 
than they will to unaligned ones. The two papers present empirical evidence to support this 
hypothesis for India and Spain, respectively. In the Spanish case, Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro 
(2007) show that municipalities aligned with an upper layer of government receive up to 40% 
more grants than those that are unaligned, a figure similar to that reported by Weingast et al. 
(2006) for Mexico. The Spanish results are robust across several specifications and, therefore, 
both the reliability and the size of the effect suggest that something important is going on. It is 
also worth mentioning that other papers –not making any specific statement about the 
behavioural reason of the finding– did previously find, for other countries, that ideology matters 
  1in the allocation of grants and other public programs (see, e.g., Grossman, 1994; and Levitt & 
Snyder, 1995).  
 
But while the evidence is compelling, nothing is known about the underlying motives that make 
grantors behave the way they do. As discussed above, papers by Arulampalam et al. (2008) and 
Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007) suggest that the answer lies in the ‘differential 
productivity’ of grants allocated to aligned vs. unaligned governments. Others, however, 
suggest that ‘clientelism’ is the reason of the biased allocation of transfers, non-aligned 
governments being punished by withdrawing transfers in order to force the population to 
dismiss the incumbent in the following election (see, e.g., Weingast et al., 2006). Note that this 
second hypothesis requires much more rationality on the part of the voters, whose voting 
decision is based not on the retrospective evaluation of monies received but on the expected 
future value of grants (which will be higher if there is alignment). Moreover, although the 
‘clientelist’ channel cannot be totally discarded in Spain (see e.g., Cazorla, 1995), the low share 
of revenues funded by discretionary grants, and the fact that there are several grantors controlled 
usually by different parties (see section 3.1), suggest that the threat of punishment is not 
particularly great in Spain and that the first explanation (‘differential productivity’) is more 
plausible. Therefore, in this paper we will concentrate in finding direct evidence that grants 
allocated to aligned governments result in more votes than grants allocated to the unaligned 
ones. We believe there is real value added on this exercise, since we don’t know of any previous 
attempt to find evidence regarding this issue. 
 
Moreover, the data we use to test this hypothesis is particularly well suited to this purpose. We 
use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on capital grants received by 617 
municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (i.e., 
Regional and Upper-local) and municipal vote data on three electoral contests held during this 
period at the municipal an regional layers. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote 
equations that analyse the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities by 
different upper layers of government on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the 
local and regional elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them 
with the average amount of grants distributed by upper layer governments. We focus our 
analysis on capital grants because these are grants that are earmarked for very specific purposes 
and that should  be solicited to the upper layer, which has some discretion in the selection of 
projects, meaning that political factors could play a role in its allocation. Note also that in the 
case of these capital grants both layers of government share the responsibilities for the service 
(e.g., the upper layer sets the eligibility criteria and provides the funds, and the lower layer 
implements the project and co-funds). This means that both layers are seen by the voters as 
  2party responsible for the service, and suggests that the allocation of these grants is likely to 
respond to differential electoral productivity
3. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that 
grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition 
parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from 
intergovernmental grants as the grantor. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present a theoretical framework that 
will allow us to motivate the vote share equation to be estimated, and to interpret the 
coefficients obtained for the grants given to aligned and unaligned governments in terms of the 
‘differential productivity’ hypothesis introduced above. The third section discusses carefully the 
econometrics of the exercise, focusing on the potential endogeneity of grants; to this end we use 
the theoretical framework developed in the previous section to guess the possible direction and 
magnitude of the bias and to propose a method to solve the problem. In the fourth section we 
briefly describe the institutional details of the Spanish case that will help to understand why we 
have adopted this particular empirical strategy. The concrete operationalization of the vote 
equation and the data used to compute the different variables are presented in the fifth section. 
The sixth section presents the results obtained. Finally, the paper ends with some conclusions 
and suggestions for further research on this issue. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
 
In this section we posit a very simple framework in order to describe how a voter decides his 
vote, depending on the alignment between the governments at different tiers. The approach used 
here is the same as that adopted in Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), who embed this 
behaviour in a model of electoral competition in order to derive implications regarding the 
effect of alignment on the amount of grants allocated. We first describe the basic set-up of the 
model: layers of government and parties. Then we describe how a voter determines his vote, 
depending on the alignment between governments at different tiers, and suggest how the vote 
equation could be specified in the empirical analysis. 
 
Basic set-up. In the model there are two upper-tier governments, each one with a jurisdiction 
covering the entire country, and a number of local governments. We will call the first tier R 
                                            
3 Nonetheless, it should be noticed that other studies (e.g. Arulampalam et al. 2008) find evidence that 
alignment do have an effect also on the allocation of unconditional grants. This could be due, for 
example, to widespread central regulations and/or to soft-budget constraint, which make voters think that 
the ultimate financial backer of the services is the central government. As we will argue at the end of the 
paper, whether co-partisanship has or not an effect on the allocation of different types of grants might be 
highly dependent on the details of each country’s federalist institutions. 
  3(Regional) and the second one U (Upper-local). For illustrative purposes, we assume that a 
different party controls each upper tier government: the R government by the right-wing party 
(r) and the U government by the left-wing one (l). Some local governments are controlled by the 
r party and some by the l party. The two parties, r and l, use the financial resources available at 
the tier of government they control to distribute grants to the local governments and advance 
their electoral prospects. Although each party controls a different government tier, and different 
elections are held at each tier, the model assumes that they are competing in the same electoral 
race, without specifying which specific election we are talking about
4.  
 
Voters’ behaviour. Voters vote on the basis of two criteria: (i) the welfare generated by grants, 
, with  >0 and  ≤0, and where  are per capita grants in 
municipality J, coming from R and U, respectively; and (ii) ideology. We define   as the 
ideological bias of voter i in favour of party l, which is unknown to the researcher;   is a 
distribution of  , with   
) ( J g u ) (
'
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( J X F ) i
( J f i i J X X F ∂ ∂ / ) ( , which is common knowledge. There is an 
additional component in the voting behaviour which is a general popularity shock,  J δ , in 
favour or against the party in the R and U governments, which is municipality-specific (but 
common to all voters) and known before grants are determined. We assume that voter i votes for 
party r if 
5
J δ + i X ≥
U
J
R g u − ( ) J g u ) ( .  
 
Now we assume that the voting decision of voter i depends on the alignment status of her local 
government. Following Arulampalam et al. (2008), we define θ  as the proportion of utility 
from grants that the voter attributes to the local government and (1–θ ) as the proportion of 
utility from grants attributed to the grantor upper layer of government. If both layers are 
controlled by the same party, then all the utility from grants is captured by this party. If control 
is split between the two parties, then utility from grants must be shared. Nothing can be a priori 
said about the value of θ , which will be derived from the estimated vote equation (see below).  
 
                                            
4 This amounts to assume that politicians at all levels are interested in advancing the prospects of the 
party in general, and not only in winning the elections held at their particular layer of government. This 
may happen, if campaigns are highly centralized, if the electoral results of a party in a given election and 
jurisdiction are influenced by the results obtained in other contests, or if winning elections helps the party 
in rewarding its supporters through the allocation of posts. 
 
5 The voter will vote for r if the welfare gain obtained from r during the last term-of-office relative to the 
one obtained from l is higher than the ideological bias in favor of l: ΔuJ
r-ΔuJ
l≥Xi+ δJ. This welfare gain is 
hypothetical and should be interpreted as the welfare increase derived from grants coming from the 
government controlled by that party compared to a situation in which all the grants came from the 
government controlled by the other party. It is only in this case that ΔuJ
r-ΔuJ
l  reduces to u(gJ
R)- u(gJ
U). 
  4Thus, if the incumbent party at municipality J is r, i.e. J is aligned with R, voter i votes for party 
r if: 
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That is, expression (1) says that if the municipality is aligned with R, all the utility coming from 
grants allocated by R is captured by the party r but, since the municipality is not aligned with U, 
also a proportion θ  of the grants allocated by U is captured by party r. Similarly, if the 
incumbent party at municipality J is l, i.e. municipality J is unaligned with R, voter i votes for 
party r if: 
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Expressions (1a) and (1b) suggest that grants from aligned upper layers of government have a 
much greater impact on the incumbent’s vote (in absolute terms) than grants coming from 
unaligned governments. In both expressions, grants coming from unaligned governments (  
in expression (1a) and   in (1b)) are interacted by the term (1-2
U
J g
R
J g θ ), which value is 
conditioned on the voter’s distribution between the grantor and the grantee of the utility derived 
from grants. The higher the proportion θ  of utility attributed to the local government is, the 
lower the impact of grants coming from unaligned government on the incumbent’s vote share is. 
 
Vote share equation. Now we can combine these two expressions to write the vote-share for the 
incumbent party at, for instance, the regional government in a municipality, as: 
 
   (2)    ) ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ( J
uR
J
aR
J J J
R
J g u g u F v δ θ − − − =
where   and   are the grants that a local government receives from aligned and unaligned 
upper layers of government, respectively. Let’s assume that utility is linear in grants (i.e., 
) and define the dummy variables   and  , which are equal to 1 if the 
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J g
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R
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U
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  5regional and upper-local governments are politically aligned with municipality J. Now, from 
expressions (1a) and (1b) we can write the utility derived from grants in a municipality aligned 
and unaligned with the regional government as: 
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Adding these two expressions and grouping the variables according to the alignment status, the 
grants received from upper layers of aligned and unaligned government can be expressed as
6:  
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Although it is not absolutely necessary to derive our testable hypothesis, the use of a particular 
vote distribution for   will help us to clarify it. For illustrative purposes, if we assume 
that   is normally distributed (i.e.,  ∼ ), being 
) ( i J X F
) ( i J X F ) ( i J X F ) , (
2 σ μJ N J μ  a municipal specific 
mean of the distribution and   its variance, which for simplicity we assume constant across 
municipalities, the vote equation would look like: 
2 σ
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approach, assuming F  is uniform with mean  J ) i (X J μ  on the support  J J μ μ + Ψ + Ψ −  this 
case the vote equation is: 
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where 2  / 1 0 = β   Ψ =  /2 1 β β , ) 2 (1   ) 2 / ( 2 θ β β − Ψ − =  and  Ψ − = 2  / 1 3 β . Note that the 
specification obtained is practically the same under both assumptions, with the exception that in 
the last case it is no longer necessary to apply any transformation to the vote share. 
 
                                            
6 Note that, since we assume that the regional government is always controlled by the right party and the 
upper-local one by the left party, we have   and  , meaning that it holds that 
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  6It is important to stress that the results of both equations have the same interpretation and allow 
us to defend the specification of an estimable vote equation to test the hypotheses we made 
regarding the effect of partisan alignment on voter behaviour. Note that in both expressions (5a 
and 5b), if    0 1 > β  and  0.5 < θ  then we expect  0 2 > β  and  2 1 β β > , if  0.5 = θ  then    0 2 = β , 
and if  0.5 > θ , then    0 2 < β and  2 1 β β > . That is, if    0 1 > β , grants to aligned municipalities 
buy votes in all feasible scenarios, but grants to unaligned municipalities might bring or detract 
votes depending on the distribution of credit between layers of government; if more credit is 
attributed to the higher layer of government than it is to the lower layer (i.e.  0.5 < θ ), these 
grants should also bring more votes (although less than grants to co-partisans); if credit is more 
or less equally split between layers (i.e.  0.5 = θ ), grants to unaligned municipalities will neither 
bring nor detract votes; and if more credit is attributed to the lower layer (i.e.  0.5 > θ ), these 
grants will detract votes (although the impact on absolute value will be lower than that of grants 
to co-partisans). In the extreme case where the grantee does not keep any political credit (i.e. 
1 = θ ) grants will have the same effect on votes independently on whether they come from 
aligned or unaligned upper layers of government. 
 
Finally, note that a feature of the model is that the results of the elections to the upper tier of 
government do not only depend on the grants distributed by the level of government analysed, 
but also on the grants distributed by all levels of government. For instance, the vote-share 
obtained by the incumbent at the regional government in a municipality depends not only on the 
grants assigned by the regional government but also on those allocated by the upper local 
government. This is the result of our assumption that governments are interested in fostering the 
‘general interests of the party’ and not only on winning their own election. Although this 
assumption is, of course, debatable, our results will allow us to test its validity.  
 
3.  Econometrics 
 
The main problem in estimating a vote equation based on (5a) or (5b) is the possible 
endogeneity of grants. The issue can be described in terms of an omitted variable problem, since 
both the average ideological attachment of the population and the popularity shock of the 
government will be very difficult to measure. For example, with   omitted from (5a) the 
model estimated will be simply
  J ρ
7: 
 
                                            
7 For simplicity, in this section in the expressions we omit the subscript that specifies the level of 
government analysed. 
  7  J
u
J
a
J J g g v η γ γ γ + + + = 2 1 0
~      with       (7)    J J J ε ρ η + =
 
where we add the  J ε  i.i.d. term to the equation. Note that, whenever   and   are correlated 
with  , the coefficients  
a
J g
u
J g
J ρ 1 ˆ γ  and  2 ˆ γ  will be biased (i.e., will differ from  1 β  and  2 β ). In our 
case this correlation is not just an empirical possibility, but can be a result of the theory. The 
paper by Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), for example, departs from the vote behaviour as 
described in (2) to derive a prediction regarding the effect of alignment on the amount of grants 
received. They assume that the objective of each party is to maximize the expected number of 
votes taking the decision of the other party as fixed (i.e., Nash behaviour) and subject to a fixed 
budget constraint. The details of the analysis are referred to that paper; here it suffices to note 
that after analysing the F.O.C. they suggest that a specification such as the following might be 
appropriate: 
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where   is the equilibrium cut-point density (i.e., a measure of the proportion of ‘swing 
voters’), which depends on the shape of the density function and on the value of the popularity 
shock, 
) ( J J f ρ
a g  and 
u g  are average per capita grants allocated to aligned and unaligned local 
governments,   is a constant picking up the effect of alignment (unalignment),  Ω   1 λ and   2 λ  are 
positive coefficients, and  J ξ  and   are i.i.d. error terms. So, theory seems to suggest that 
popularity shocks (i.e., 
J ω
J ρ ) do have some effects on grants allocated, implying that there could 
be a possible omitted variable bias problem. The formulas for the bias of the estimated    ˆ1 γ and 
  ˆ2 γ coefficients can be expressed as: 
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  8where  ,
2
ρ σ
2
a g σ ,
2
u g σ ,   and   are the variances of the popularity shock, average grants 
distributed from aligned and unaligned governments, and error terms of equations (8a) and (8b), 
respectively. Note that the direction of the bias depends on the sign of 
2
ξ σ
2
ω σ
J J f ρ ∂ ∂ / . Suppose for a 
moment that this derivative is negative (i.e., the shock decreases the proportion of ‘swing 
voters’, something that happens on the right-wing side of the density function, once we assume 
F is symmetric and single-peaked as in Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007)); in this case, both 
coefficients are downward biased, since   1 β is positive and    2 β is expected to be negative or 
zero. Note also that the bias shall be in both cases of a similar magnitude, whenever 
2
a g σ  and 
 in (9a) are similar to their counterparts in (9b) (i.e., 
2
ξ σ
2
u g σ  and  ). This means than if 
2
ω σ   1 β is 
higher (in absolute terms) than 2 β , the OLS estimates of equation (7) should also give  1 ˆ γ >   ˆ2 γ . 
Note that if  J J ρ φ ∂ ∂ /  is positive (i.e., the ‘shock’ increases the proportion of ‘swing voters’, 
something that happens on the left-wing side of the density function) then the coefficients are 
upward biased; however, it is also plausible that the OLS coefficients say that  1 ˆ γ >   ˆ2 γ when 
grants to aligned governments bring more votes than grants to unaligned ones.  
 
But although this is an interesting property, it only allows us to guess if our main hypothesis is 
valid (i.e., grants to co-partisans buy more support than grants to the opposition), without 
allowing us to obtain a more precise estimate of the degree to which credit for grants is 
transferred from the grantor to the grantee; for this we need to gauge the magnitude of the θ  
parameter, an impossible task given the bias of  2 ˆ γ . It would also be helpful to know something 
about the direction of the bias, but this depends on the sign of  J J f ρ ∂ ∂ / . If the density was 
symmetric and single peaked, and since we know that there is some incumbency advantage (see, 
e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007b), we can assume that most municipalities are on the right-hand 
side of  , meaning that  J f J J f ρ ∂ ∂ / <0. This would mean that there are some arguments to expect 
that the    ˆ γ coefficients are biased downwards. 
 
However, it would be much better to solve the endogeneity problem. Here we propose the use 
of an Instrumental Variables procedure. Note that expressions (8a) and (8b) already propose one 
instrument for each of our endogenous variables; these are simply the average per capita amount 
of grants distributed by aligned and unaligned higher layers of government (i.e., 
a g    and 
u g ). 
The intuition here is quite clear: municipalities belonging to regions where Regional and Upper-
Local governments distribute huge amounts of grants will, in general, receive more transfers 
than municipalities belonging to regions where few grants are allocated to local governments. It 
can be argued convincingly that these two variables do not belong to the vote-share equation. 
  9Note that it is difficult to imagine that the effects of grants could spill over to other 
municipalities belonging to the same geographical area (i.e., receiving grants from the same 
upper-layer governments) and controlled by the same party. Therefore, given that it is quite 
plausible that these instruments are not correlated with the error term  J η , their use will allow us 
to obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters of interest. Moreover, as will be checked in the 
next section, these instruments have a considerable explanatory capacity in the first-stage 
regression, allowing us to avoid the problem of weak instruments.  
 
This procedure is similar to that adopted by Levitt and Snyder (1997) for the U.S. case. The 
only drawback faced by these authors is the impossibility of using over-identification tests to 
check the validity of the instruments. Although they acknowledge the presence of this problem, 
they believe that the theoretical justification of the instrument is sufficient to defend its validity. 
In our case, we will not rely exclusively on intuition to justify the instruments used. Note from 
(4) that both grants coming from aligned and unaligned grantors could be split in two different 
components. Similarly, we can divide each of our instruments (
a g  and 
u g ) in two; for 
example, in the case of 
a g  we now have 
R
J
R
J
aR g a g =  and 
U
J
U
J
aU g a = g
                                           
. By having two 
instruments for each endogenous variable, we are able to compute the Hansen overidentifying 
restriction test to check the validity of the instruments. 
 
4.  Institutional background of Spain 
 
Layers of government and transfers 
 
Spain is a fiscally decentralized country with three layers of government: Central, Regional and 
Local. There are seventeen regional governments, the so-called Autonomous Communities 
(ACs), which have very important spending responsibilities including, for example, the 
provision of health care, education and welfare. Each AC is composed by one or more 
provinces. In the ACs composed by more than one province, there exists an upper-tier of local 
government, called Diputación, referred to here as Upper-Local. Although this upper-tier of 
local government has fewer spending responsibilities than the municipalities, which are the 
main players in the local public sector, allocation of grants for capital infrastructure to 
municipalities is one of their most important tasks
8. 
 
8 In ACs with only one province (there are six ACs of this kind), there is no Diputación, and its 
responsibilities are assumed by the regional government.  
 
  10Spain has over eight thousand municipalities although most are quite small. Municipalities are 
multi-purpose governments, with major expenditure categories corresponding to the traditional 
responsibilities assigned to the local public sector (environmental services, urban planning, 
public transport, welfare, etc.) with the exception of education, which is a responsibility of the 
regional government. Current spending is financed out of own revenues (2/3 approx.) and 
unconditional grants (1/3 approx.) which are allocated by a formula that makes their use 
difficult for pork-barrel politics. However, the funding of capital spending depends heavily on 
grants: in 2003, capital grants represented 13% of non-financial revenues and 44% of capital 
spending. These grants came from the three upper-layers of government: Central  (15%), 
Regional (45%) and Upper-Local (21%)
9. Most of the grants take the form of ‘project grants’: 
there is an open call at regular periods (usually yearly) and the municipality must apply by 
submitting several infrastructure projects. These are evaluated in accordance with pre-
established criteria (usually published in the call), but that are, nevertheless, subject to the 
interpretation of the grantor. Therefore, the degree of political discretion applied to these grants 
can be qualified as high. 
 
Elections and parties 
 
In Spain, central elections are usually held at regular four-year periods, although they can be 
called before the end of the term-of-office. Municipal and regional elections are held regularly 
every four years and on the same day in twelve out of seventeen ACs. In the period analysed, 
they were called one or two years before the general election. In the other ACs, elections were 
called before the end of the term and, therefore, were held on a different day. 
 
In the elections to the central and regional legislatures, the electoral districts are the provinces. 
A different number of representatives is elected in each province depending on its population 
size; candidates are included in parties’ closed lists; and the d’Hondt formula with a threshold is 
used to translate the number of votes into the number of representatives (Colomer, 1995). 
Therefore, the system is not entirely proportional and, in fact, it is much easier to win a seat in 
some provinces (rural areas) than in others. Due to the closed-list system, parties are highly 
disciplined, both inside the legislatures and (to a lesser extent) across layers of government. 
Since the party has a great influence on the future prospects of politicians (through the 
allocation of posts and places on the lists), they use to be loyal to the constituency but also to 
the party. 
 
                                            
9 The remaining 18% correspond to other sources (e.g., the EU) or to unclassified grants. 
  11In municipal elections closed lists are also adopted, the number of city councillors depends on 
population size, and the d’Hondt rule is also used, but in this case there is just a single district. 
As Colomer (1995) states: “these rules provide incentives for sincere voting and promote a high 
degree of pluralism in city councils”. As a result, there is a high proportion of coalition 
governments; for example, in the 1996-99 term 43.3% of the municipalities where governed by 
coalitions (Solé-Ollé, 2006). Most municipal candidates are aligned along national or regional 
party lines. The local political system is seen as a first step in the process of recruitment into the 
regional and national political elite (Magre, 1999). There are no specific elections to the 
assembly of the upper-tiers of local governments; the representatives of Diputaciones  are 
elected on the basis of the results at the municipal elections. The votes for each party are 
aggregated across municipalities and the number of representatives is obtained, once again, by 
using the d’Hondt formula. These upper-tiers of government have been criticised on the grounds 
of their low level of electoral accountability: with few clear responsibilities and no need to go to 
the polls, politicians controlling this layer of government can use grants to foster the parties’ 
prospects at the next municipal election. 
 
The nature of the Spanish electoral and party system described above means that the elections 
held at each layer of government are not entirely independent of the national or regional 
political situation. In fact, parties follow the results of regional and municipal elections with 
great interest. Since these contests are usually held one or two years before the central elections, 
they provide an excellent occasion to test the real prospects of the party
10. Therefore, although 
most efforts are focused locally, the parties do design a centralized (national and/or regional) 
strategy for these contests. This strategy includes statements regarding which regions and/or 
municipalities deserve greater campaign efforts
11, either because the perceived electoral margin 
is low or because the region or the city is seen as having special significance in the eyes of 
voters (e.g., big cities). In the Spanish context, it is therefore natural to believe that just before 
an election, a party uses the various posts they control at different layers of government to 
allocate grants to pursue its electoral objectives. The high degree of partisan control exercised 
both inside and across layers of government facilitates the use of resources coming from 
different posts for the fulfilment of party interests. 
 
                                            
10 This is due to the fact that national and/or regional political shocks do affect the results of these lower 
tier elections (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2005, and Rodden et al., 2005, for evidence of this effect in 
Spain and other countries, respectively). In fact, local electoral results are seen as predictors of the 
parties’ prospects for the next general election.  
 
11 One year before the May 2007 municipal elections the newspaper El País published a report on the 
prospects for this contest entitled: “PSOE and PP open the battle town by town” and identified the regions 
and municipalities where each party would concentrate its efforts (source: El País, 23 April 2006, p. 26: 
“PSOE y PP abren la batalla pueblo a pueblo”). 
  125.  Empirical analysis 
 
Vote equations 
 
The specification of our vote equation is built upon the results presented above in the theoretical 
section. Although the Spanish case described above provides us with three upper-tier grantor 
governments (Central,  Regional and Upper-Local), we will only analyse how the election 
results of the incumbent party/parties at the Regional and Local levels are affected by the grants 
allocated by the Regional and Upper-Local governments. We decided not to analyse the effects 
of central grants on the results of these elections and not to analyse the results of the general 
elections because these grants account for less money than the others and because the 
improvement of municipal infrastructure plays only a minor role in shaping the electoral agenda 
of the Spanish general legislative elections. This, however, is not the case of the regional and 
local elections, since the ACs, the Diputaciones and the municipalities are all responsible for the 
delivery of these services. Thus, we implicitly assume that the parties use the grants they control 
at the Upper-Local and Regional layers to influence the results of both the regional and the local 
elections. We do not analyse the election results of the incumbent at the Upper-Local level, 
since, as it has been said, there are no direct elections to the Upper-Local governments. Its 
representatives are elected as a product of the results of the municipal elections.  
 
Thus, as starting point, we will estimate the following two equations: 
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where   and   are the vote shares of the incumbent party/parties in the Regional (R) and 
Local (L) governments in the regional and local elections held at t, respectively; and   and 
 are the amounts of total capital grants per capita received by municipality J in the two years 
prior to election t. That is,   =  and   =  . The computation of these 
variables will be described bellow. This equation allows us to test whether capital grants do 
have any effect on the vote share. Note that this specification implicitly assumes that the grantee 
does not keep any political credit and thus, all grants have the same effect (i.e., increase the vote 
for the municipal incumbent), independently on whether they come from aligned or unaligned 
governments.  
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  13Secondly, in order to test our hypothesis that is, that grants allocated to aligned governments 
result in more votes than grants allocated to the unaligned ones, we will estimate the previous 
equations, but decomposing the grant variable depending on whether they come from aligned or 
unaligned governments. This will allow us to infer the value of θ , i.e., the distribution of the 
political credit of grants among the grantor and the grantee. Thus, we will estimate the 
following equations: 
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The grant variable labelled with superscript a in expression (10c),  , indicates the amount of 
money per capita received by municipality J in the two years prior to election t from the 
incumbent at the upper-local and regional governments with whom it is aligned, less –when not 
aligned with the incumbent at the level of government under analysis– the amount of money per 
capita received by municipality J from the layers of government with which it is aligned. Thus, 
 is computed as: 
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where   and   are equal to 1 if the regional and upper-local government are aligned with the 
municipal government, respectively. The grant variable labelled with superscript u in expression 
(10c) indicates the amount of grants per capita received by municipality J in the two years prior 
to election t from the upper level incumbent governments with whom it is unaligned. Thus,   
is computed as: 
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Note that although these expressions might seem rather complex, these calculations are nothing 
more than the transposition of expression (4) to a more realistic setting
12. The intuition behind 
the specification in (11) is that the electoral prospects of the incumbent at some high layer of 
government increases the more grants it is able to channel to aligned municipalities (coming 
 
12 Note that in the real world we should allow for   and  , since a local 
government can also be aligned or unaligned with both upper layers of governments. 
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  14directly from its budget or from the budgets of other layers of government also controlled by the 
same party) and the fewer grants other layers of government controlled by the opposition are 
able to channel to municipalities which are not aligned with it.  
 
It can be argued, of course, that this computation is overly complex, since voters might be able 
to disentangle the purpose of the different electoral contests and, therefore, only take into 
account the grants coming from the incumbent at his own election. In other words, and contrary 
to what expressions (11) and (12) might suggest, only Regional grants have some impact on the 
vote at regional elections but not Upper-Local grants. This means that politicians would not be 
able to foster the ‘general interests of the party’ (as we assumed in the theoretical section), using 
the grants at their disposal to influence elections at any layer of government, but rather they are 
forced to compete in only one election. To verify this possibility we will decompose expressions 
(11) and (12) into two different variables. So, we will have grants coming from aligned grantors 
computed separately for the Regional and Upper-Local grantor: 
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and also grants coming from unaligned grantors computed separately for the Regional and 
Upper-Local grantor: 
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The four variables will be included in the equation. In the event that only (13a) is statistically 
significant, we should conclude that grants only have an effect on those elections at which the 
grantor is the incumbent, and not on elections held at other layers where the incumbent is not 
the grantor but one of his co-partisans at the other layers. 
 
When analysing the results at the local elections, the expression used to calculate the grants 
coming from aligned and unaligned governments are the following:  
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These expressions are much simpler than the ones defined when analysing the results at the 
regional election, since the alignment variable is defined in relation to the incumbent at the level 
of government under analysis. Nonetheless, these expressions capture the same information. 
 
Note, finally, that the vote equations in (10a), (10b), (10c) and (10d) also include a term 
measuring the ideological attachment of the population and/or the popularity shock experienced 
by the government, which differs from one equation to the other:   and  . The m 
superscript means that these popularity effects are considered measurable. To account for them 
we include a set of proxies to be described below. Finally, these equations include an error term 
composed by an immeasurable shock and an i.i.d disturbance (e.g.,  ). As this 
popularity shock can be correlated with the amount of grants received (either from aligned or 
from unaligned grantors), we face a potential problem of endogeneity for which the use of 
instrumental variables is recommended, as argued in section 3.1.  
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Data description 
 
Selecting the sample. We estimate the effects of grants on the municipal vote share obtained by 
the incumbent party/parties at regional and local layer of government. We use a rich database, 
which provides information about the vote share of parties at different types of elections and 
about the grants received by 617 municipalities from different grantors during the period 1993-
2003. Voting data come from information provided by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, in 
the case of the local elections, and directly from each of the Regional governments, in the case 
of the regional elections. The data on grants come from a survey on budget outlays conducted 
yearly by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. The initial number of municipalities was 
much higher (2,799), but we could not use the municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants 
due to the lack of socio-economic data, and we also lose some municipalities due to the lack of 
data on transfers by grantor. Moreover, we only use the municipalities that belong to a region 
where the Upper-Local government exists. However, we believe that despite this reduction in 
the number of observations the sample is still representative of Spanish municipalities with 
more than 1,000 inhabitants, since we checked that the municipalities lost because of the 
unavailability of the breakdown in transfers are distributed proportionally according to 
population size and alignment status. 
 
  16Measuring votes: The vote variables are calculated as the share of votes obtained by the 
incumbent party/parties at the Local and Regional government in each municipality at the 
municipal and regional elections, respectively. To construct these variables we use the electoral 
results of the municipal and regional elections held in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003.  
 
Measuring grants. Our grant variables are capital grants (chapter 7 of the budget) coming from 
each upper layer of government (R and U). As we have already said, we only focus our analysis 
in capital grants, since their distribution is not formula based and, thus, they are more likely to 
be distributed according to their electoral productivity. Total grants are summed together for the 
last two years of each term-of-office and then divided by the population of the municipality at 
the beginning of these two-year periods, using data from the National Institute of Statistics 
(INE). We have assumed that grants received during the election year benefit the incumbent 
government and not the incoming one. We believe that this assumption is reasonable, given that 
municipal elections are generally held in the middle of the year (May or June) and that grantor 
governments usually exhaust their yearly grants budget early, just before the next election. 
Thus, we set out to explain the effect of grants on the electoral reward by examining the overall 
amount of grants received in 1994-95 for the term 1991-95, in 1998-99 for the term 1996-99, 
and in 2002-03 for the term 2000-03. There are three reasons that justify this decision. The first 
one is the fact that in some ACs it is not always easy to identify alignment between layers of 
government given the different timing of regional and local elections. Thus, the alternative 
procedure of aggregating grants over an entire local term of office would have run into the 
problem of changing alignment in the middle of a period (since some regional elections are held 
at a date some time between local elections). The second reason is that by aggregating the grants 
variable over two years, we reduce the volatility of this variable. The third reason is that, as the 
political cycle literature has emphasised, the temptation to use public funds to buy votes 
increases as the next election approaches, suggesting that the electoral reward will be higher in 
that time period
13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 See, e.g., Castells & Solé-Ollé (2005) for evidence indicating that pork-barrel politics in Spain 
intensifies as an election approaches. 
  17Table 1. Definition of the variables, descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description  Mean 
(S.D) 
Source 
  R
Jt v   Vote share of the Regional incumbent 
party/parties at the regional elections in 
municipality J 
0.502 
(0.277) 
Ministry of Interior 
M
Jt v   Vote share of the Upper-Local 
incumbent party at the local elections in 
municipality J 
0.535 
(0.169) 
Ministry of Interior 
aR
Jt g   Capital grants from aligned upper-layers 
of government to municipalities aligned 
with the Regional government, per capita 
36.798 
(71.662) 
uR
Jt g   Capital grants from unaligned upper-
layers of government to municipalities 
unaligned with the Regional 
government, per capita 
17.979 
(49.803) 
aM
Jt g   Capital grants from aligned upper-layers 
of government to municipalities aligned 
with the Upper local government, per 
capita 
41.699 
(64.436) 
uM
Jt g   Capital grants to municipalities from 
unaligned upper-layers of government 
unaligned with the Upper local 
government, per capita 
27.653 
(62.533) 
Coalition 
(Municipal) 
1 if coalition in Municipal govt. 
0 otherwise 
0.532 
(0.234) 
First term-of-office 
(Municipal) 
1 if Municipal govt. in its first term, 0 
otherwise 
0.245 
(0.127) 
Coalition 
(Regional) 
1 if coalition in Regional govt. 
0 otherwise 
0.267 
(0.442) 
First term-of-office 
(Regional) 
1 if Regional govt. in its first term, 0 
otherwise 
0.709 
(0.454) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Economics 
and Finance (grants) 
and Ministry of Public 
Administrations 
(alignment) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
Growth rate of per capita unemployment 
in the municipality  
-0.125 
(0.190) 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) & 
Anuario Social de 
España (La Caixa) 
Δ Population 
 
Growth rate of the population in the 
municipality  
0.034 
(0.089) 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
Growth rate in the effective property tax 
rate: growth in nominal tax rate + growth 
in assessed value  
0.021 
(0.123) 
Property Tax Statistics 
‘Centro de Gestión 
Catastral’ (Ministry of 
Economics and 
Finance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  18Measuring alignment. As discussed in Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), the concept of 
alignment is straightforward when dealing with single-party governments. In such instances, a 
municipality is said to be aligned with an upper-layer grantor government if the party 
controlling the government at both layers is the same. However, in Spain a large number of 
governments (at all layers) are coalitions. Coalitions make the definition of alignment between 
layers more difficult. A party at a given layer of government may play at least three different 
roles: i) the single party in government, ii) the main partner or the leader of a coalition, and iii) a 
mere partner of the leading party in a coalition.  
 
As explained in the theoretical discussion above, the amount of grants transferred to 
municipalities belonging to each of these government types depends on the credit lost by the 
grantor government. If both layers are controlled by the same single party, no credit is lost, but 
when this party is the leader of a municipal coalition, part of the credit will flow to its local 
partner(s). If this party is a mere partner in the municipal coalition, the leading party may obtain 
a larger share of the credit. These considerations do not seem to depend on the status of the 
upper layer. For this reason, we have decided to use a dummy variable to identify the alignment 
status that is equal to one when either the single-party or the leader of the coalition in the 
municipal government is the same party as that in the upper layer of government (also a single 
party or coalition leader). Otherwise, this alignment dummy variable is equal to zero.  
 
To compute these measures of alignment, we use a database provided by the Spanish Ministry 
of Public Administration, which gives information about the party of the mayoralty and (in the 
case of coalitions) the other parties in the municipal governments, following the local elections 
of 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003. For the upper tier of local government, this database provides 
information about the party of the president and the composition of the assembly. Data 
regarding the party of the president of the AC and the other parties in the regional governments 
come from www.eleweb.com. In all cases, minority governments have been considered as 
coalitions. The party of the president or of the mayor is considered the Leader while the other 
parties in the coalition are considered as being the Partners. 
 
Control variables. In both vote equations we include variables that account for the ideological 
attachment of the voting population and for the popularity shock experienced by the incumbent 
prior to each election (i.e., termed   and  in equations (10a) and (10b)). First, we include 
the lagged vote-share of the incumbent party/parties in order to account for the persistence of 
ideological attachments and popularity shocks. Second, to account for popularity shifts that 
have a differential effect on each of the parties at each election, we include a set of Election × 
mR
Jt ρ
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  19Party and Election × Region dummies; we also tried with Election × Region × Party dummies, 
but adding the interaction of the party and regional dimension did not improve the fit of the 
equations significantly. Third, we also include certain government traits which might either be 
rewarded or punished by the voters. We include a dummy for coalition governments and a 
dummy reflecting whether it is the first term that this party is in the government or not. A 
government is considered a coalition if the incumbent party had less than 50% of the seats. A 
government is classified as being in its first term of office if the party of the incumbent had 
changed between one four-year period and the next. We expect a negative sign for the first 
variable, indicating that voters dislike coalitions because of their inability to take decisions, and 
a positive one for the second one, suggesting that voters are more likely to give a second chance 
to new governments. Our expectations are based on previous results recorded in the Spanish 
municipal elections (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 2007b). We also experimented 
with a more detailed breakdown of both variables, including dummies for minority governments 
and for those in their second and third terms-of-office, but these variables were excluded from 
the final regressions as they were not significant.  
 
Fourth, to account for the structural ideological attachment to some parties among voters in 
certain municipalities we include the average vote of the party/parties in all the elections held 
since 1979. Fifth, since this ideological attachment might evolve over time with a change in the 
socio-economic traits of the voting population, we also include the rate of unemployment and 
three population size dummies (i.e., smaller than 5,000, between 5,000 and 20,000, and bigger 
than 20,000) interacted with the party dummies. As we will explain in greater detail in the next 
section, these interactions were barely significant and did not alter our main results. Thus, we 
decided not to include them in the tables.  
 
Finally, we control for other variables that might have an impact on popularity, including the 
growth rate of per capita unemployment and population, and the increase in the property tax 
rate, which is the main municipal tax in Spain and previous papers have shown that it has a 
significant impact on the vote for the party/parties in the local government (see, e.g., Bosch & 
Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 2007b). The increase in the unemployment rate is included in both 
equations (local and regional elections). The population growth and property tax increase 
variables are included only in the case of the local elections, since in the eyes of the voters it is 
the local councils that are largely responsible for these matters. 
 
 
 
 
  206.  Results 
 
The results of the estimation of the effects of grants on votes for the incumbent are presented in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 presents the basic results, that is, the effect of total grants on the vote 
share of the incumbent at the local government and their effect when allowing for a differential 
effect of grants coming from aligned or unaligned grantors. Table 3 reports the same results for 
the vote share at the regional government. In both tables, the first two columns show the OLS 
results and then the Instrumental Variable (IV) ones. Table 4 presents the results when allowing 
for a differential effect of grants depending on the grantee layer of government (Regional or 
Upper-Local). All tables estimate the linear version of the vote equation (5b), and use a limited 
set of controls. A discussion of the estimation of the non-linear version (5a) and the use of 
additional controls is included at the end of this section. 
 
Table 2 shows, first, that total grants have a positive and significant effect on the incumbent’s 
vote share at the local elections, result that does not hold when using IV. Second the results 
point out that the effect of grants is significantly different depending on whether they come 
from aligned or unaligned governments. Concretely, the OLS estimators conclude that grants 
from aligned governments,  , have a positive and significant impact on the incumbent’s vote 
share at the local election while those from unaligned governments,  , do not have any 
impact on the vote. These results hold in the case of the IV using average grants as instruments. 
The first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instruments suggest that the set of instruments used 
are jointly highly significant predictors in the first stage (they are much bigger than the 
threshold proposed by Stock and Yogo, 2003), and thus, they are not weak. Moreover, the value 
of the Hansen overidentification test indicates that the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term. These tests corroborate the validity of the instruments. We perform the regression 
based Hausman endogeneity test (Wooldridge, 2002), which corroborates that there is a 
problem of endogeneity. The IV coefficients are higher than the OLS. Thus, the OLS estimates 
seem to be biased downwards.  
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  21Table 2. Effects of grants on the vote share of parties 
 in the Local government at the Local elections 
 OLS  IV 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Grants (×100 є),           
  total grants  0.013 
(2.71)
*** 
-.- 0.016 
(0.72) 
0.013 
(0.57) 
-.- 
  from aligned grantors (g
a ) -.-  0.032 
(6.26)
*** 
-.-  -.-  0.074 
(2.37)
** 
  from unaligned grantors (g
u )  -.-  -0.010 
(-1.48) 
-.-  -.-  0.031 
(0.91) 
Lagged vote share   0.378 
(9.61)
*** 
0.378 
(9.72)
*** 
0.377 
(9.14)
*** 
0.378 
(9.16)
*** 
0.354 
(8.62)
*** 
Average vote share 
 
0.307 
(8.78)
*** 
0.304 
(8.77)
*** 
0.307 
(8.49)
*** 
0.307 
(8.54)
*** 
0.287 
(7.48)
*** 
First term   0.041 
(4.00)
*** 
0.044 
(4.32)
*** 
0.041 
(3.95)
*** 
0.041 
(3.98)
*** 
0.040 
(3.98)
*** 
Coalition  -0.064 
(-7.21)
*** 
-0.068 
(-7.78)
 *** 
-0.065 
(-5.69)
*** 
-0.064 
(-5.60)
 *** 
-0.080 
(-6.37)
*** 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.005 
(-1.03) 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
-0.019 
(-1.13) 
Δ Population  
 
0.059 
(1.69)
* 
0.060 
(1.65)
* 
0.063 
(1.68)
* 
0.058 
(1.65)
* 
0.118 
(1.77)
* 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
-0.014 
(-1.67)
* 
-0.019 
(-1.68)
* 
-0.019 
(-1.66)
* 
-0.014 
(-1.66)
* 
-0.002 
(-1.69)
* 
Region × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES  YES 
Party × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adj R
2  0.943 0.944  0.943  0.943  0.941 
F-stat. (zero slopes)  678.64 
[0.000] 
795.85 
[0.000] 
10322.52 
[0.000] 
10439.27 
[0.000] 
26244.54 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × Election)  3.09 
[0.000] 
3.42 
[0.000] 
108.40 
[0.000] 
108.25 
[0.000] 
105.21 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election)  2.77 
[0.000] 
2.50 
[0.000] 
49.47 
[0.000] 
49.09 
[0.000] 
47.34 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election  
             + Region × Election) 
8.39 
[0.000] 
8.50 
[0.000] 
530.98 
[0.000] 
354.59 
[0.000] 
343.87 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1
st stage excluded 
instruments  -.- -.- 
39.04 
[0.000] 
21.65 
[0.000] 
131.05 
[0.000] 
Hansen  test 
(overidentification)  -.- -.-  -.- 0.750 
[0.386] 
1.715 
[0.424] 
Hausman test (OLS  IV)  ≠ -.-  -.-  0.89 
(2.01)
** 
0.87 
(2.04)
** 
3.25 
[0.039] 
No obs.  1795 1795  1795  1795  1795 
Notes: (1) t  statistics are shown in parenthesis and p-values in brackets; *, ** & ***: significantly 
different from zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels; (2) Robust standard errors; (3) Dependent variable is 
the vote share of the party/parties in the local government in the local elections; (4) Hansen test for 
instrument validity, distributed as a  ( ) n
2 χ  with n = number of over-identifying restrictions (p-value in 
brackets). (5): The Hausman test is based on the residuals of the first stage regression. When there is only 
one instrument, we report the estimated coefficient of the residuals, otherwise the F-test of joint 
significance is reported. (6) Instruments used: [3]:  g ; [4]:  ) (UL g
L ,  ) (R g
L ; [5]  ) (UL g
aL ,  ) (UL g
uL , 
, ) (R g
aL   ) (R g
uL  
 
  22Table 3. Effects of grants on the vote share of parties 
 in the Regional government at the Regional elections  
 OLS   IV  
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Grants (×100 є),           
   total grants  0.004 
(2.08)
**  -.-  0.004 
(0.75) 
0.004 
(0.81)  -.- 
  from aligned grantors (g
a ) -.-  0.008 
(3.35)
 ** 
-.-  -.-  0.009 
(1.68)
* 
  from unaligned grantors (g
u )  -.-  0.001 
(0.09) 
-.-  -.-  -0.001 
(-0.25) 
Lagged vote share   0.428 
(12.05)
*** 
0.420 
(11.90)
*** 
0.428 
(12.10) 
0.428 
(12.12)
*** 
0.417 
(11.72)
*** 
Average vote share 
 
0.453 
(13.08)
*** 
0.449 
(13.07)
*** 
0.453 
(13.11) 
0.453 
(13.09)
*** 
0.447 
(13.15)
*** 
First term   0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Coalition  -0.063 
(-5.69)
*** 
-0.068 
(-6.26)
 *** 
-0.053 
(6.26) 
-0.086 
(-8.27)
 *** 
-0.056 
(-6.01) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.006 
(-1.29) 
-0.008 
(-1.39) 
-0.007 
(-1.28) 
-0.007 
(-1.27) 
-0.008 
(-1.40) 
Region × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES  YES 
Party × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adj R
2  0.990 0.990  0.990  0.990  0.990 
F-stat. (zero slopes)  1789.02 
[0.000] 
1452.33 
[0.000] 
3901.22 
[0.000] 
3987.24 
[0.000] 
2157.44 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × Election)  56.85 
[0.000] 
61.45 
[0.000] 
889.90 
[0.000] 
890.11 
[0.000] 
731.61 
[0.000] 
F-stat  
 (zero Party × Election) 
50.89 
[0.000] 
40.40 
[0.000] 
164.91 
[0.000] 
165.13 
[0.000] 
120.22 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party×Election   
             + Region × Election) 
49.79 
[0.000] 
50.56 
[0.000] 
1033.35 
[0.000] 
1034.01 
[0.000] 
1057.78 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1
st stage excluded 
instruments  -.- -.-  129.90 
[0.000] 
66.06 
[0.000] 
128.49 
[0.000]] 
Hansen  test (overidentification)  -.- -.-  -.- 0.401 
[0.526] 
0.342 
[0.558] 
Hausman test (OLS ≠ IV)     0.47 
(1.02) 
0.48 
(1.03) 
 0.983 
[0.375] 
No obs.  1795 1795  1795  1795  1795 
    
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2): Instruments used: [4]:  ) (UL g
R ,  ) (R g
R ; [5]: ,  ) (R g
aR ) (UL g
aR , 
) ( UL R g
uR +  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  23When moving to the analysis of the effect of grants on the vote share obtained by the incumbent 
at each municipality at the regional elections (Table 3), we get the same conclusions. That is, 
capital grants do buy votes, but only those coming from aligned governments. This results hold 
for OLS and IV estimators, and the estimated coefficients are quite similar. In fact, the Hausman 
test concludes that there is not an endogeneity problem and thus, OLS are the appropriate 
estimates here.  
 
Thus, these results suggest that grants to aligned municipalities have some impact on local and 
regional government incumbent’s vote share. The estimated coefficient for unaligned grants is 
zero: grants to governments controlled by the opposition do not result in a single additional 
vote. Therefore, our results confirm the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis: grants to aligned 
governments buy more votes than grants to unaligned ones. This is due to the fact that in the 
case of unaligned grants, some political credit goes to the grantee, which is controlled by the 
opposition. In fact, our results suggest that the political credit derived from grants is split 
equally between the grantor and the grantee. To understand this result, recall from expression 
(5b) that the coefficients of aligned and unaligned grants can be expressed as  Ψ =  /2 1 β β  and 
) 2 (1   ) 2 / ( 2 θ β β − Ψ − = , respectively, meaning that the findings    0 1 > β and    0 = 2 β suggest that 
.  0.5 = θ
 
The extended results are presented in Table 4 and reinforce our previous conclusions. All grants 
given to aligned municipalities have some impact on the two elections, while grants given to 
unaligned municipalities never have a significant impact on the vote. That is, the vote that the 
parties in the Regional government obtain at the local elections increases with grants if this 
municipality is controlled by the same party/coalition, and this is true for grants allocated by the 
Regional government as well as for grants allocated by the Upper-Local  government (if 
controlled by the same party/coalition). Similarly, the vote obtained by parties in the Local 
government in a municipality increases with grants allocated by the Regional aligned 
governments as well as with grants allocated by the Upper-Local aligned governments. These 
results confirm the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis and provide some evidence (albeit that 
it should be interpreted with caution given the high standard errors) to support the assumption 
that upper-layer governments do care about the ‘general interests of the party’ and not just about 
the results obtained at their own election. Note that, in any case, the impact of Upper-Local 
grants is higher for local than for regional elections and that the impact of Regional grants is 
higher for regional than for local elections, meaning that it is better to try to influence the results 
of one’s own elections than those held at the other layer. This is quite reasonable as voters 
might be more able to make politicians accountable when they are being evaluated directly.  
  24Table 4. Effects of grants on the vote share of  
Local and Regional governments. Breakdown by layer  
  Local elections  Regional elections 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Grants (×100 є),         
          from aligned grantors (g
a )        
               - Upper-Local grantor  0.042 
(4.30)
*** 
0.092 
(2.42)
** 
0.006 
(1.97)
** 
0.014 
(1.65)
* 
               - Regional grantor  0.028 
(4.55)
*** 
0.045 
(2.02)
** 
0.014 
(2.61)
*** 
0.017 
(1.69)
* 
          from unaligned grantors (g
u )  -0.010 
(-1.51) 
0.033 
(0.98) 
0.001
 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
Lagged vote share   0.376 
(9.66)
*** 
0.354 
(8.57)
*** 
0.418 
(11.74)
*** 
0.417 
(11.68)
*** 
Average vote share 
 
0.304 
(8.77)
*** 
0.283 
(7.26)
*** 
0.450 
(13.06)
*** 
0.451 
(12.86)
*** 
First term   0.044 
(4.31)
*** 
0.040 
(3.64)
*** 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
Coalition  -0.067 
(-7.80)
*** 
-0.082 
(-6.47)
 *** 
-0.071 
(-6.61)
*** 
0.012 
(1.07) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
-0.008 
(-1.34) 
-0.009 
(-1.43) 
Δ Population  
 
0.062 
(1.65)
* 
0.117 
(1.76)
*  -.- -.- 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
-0.012 
(-1.66)
* 
-0.002 
(-1.67)
*  -.- -.- 
Region × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES 
Party × Election effects  YES YES  YES  YES 
Adj R
2  0.944 0.940  0.990  0.907 
F-stat. (zero slopes)  749.13 
[0.000] 
25438.29 
[0.000] 
1542.88 
[0.000] 
802.15 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × Election)  4.15 
[0.000] 
117.12 
[0.000] 
69.55 
[0.000] 
149.31 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election)  3.27 
[0.000] 
49.15 
[0.000] 
53.15 
[0.000] 
987.15 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party×Election   
             + Region × Election) 
8.79 
[0.000] 
352.19 
[0.000] 
69.18 
[0.000] 
749.01 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1
st stage excluded instruments 
-.-  90.62 
[0.000]  -.- 
69.52 
[0.000] 
Hansen  test (overidentification)  -.-  0.823 
[0.364]  -.-  5.424 
[0.143] 
No obs.  1795 1795  1795  1795 
   
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2): Instruments used: [4]:  ) (UL g
aL ,  ) (UL g
uL   ) (R g
aL   ) (R g
uL ; [5]: , 
) (R g
aR ) (UL g
aR ,  ) (R g
uR ,  ) (UL g
uR  
 
 
 
 
 
  25Note that the estimated effect of aligned grants on the vote share of the incumbent is higher at 
the local elections than it is at the regional ones. To give an interpretation to these values we 
have to make an assumption on the vote distribution function. For illustrative purpose, if we 
assume that it is uniform, 100 € more in aligned grants from regional governments gives rise to 
an increase of 1.7% in the vote share of the parties in the regional government. This means that 
the expected vote shares with and without these grants would have been 50.2% and 51.9%, 
respectively. Nevertheless, our aim is not to compute the electoral productivity of grants, but to 
provide evidence that grants have different electoral productivity depending on whether they are 
assigned to aligned or unaligned municipalities.  
 
Thus, the results of the basic model (Tables 2 and 3) and those obtained from a breakdown by 
tier of government (Table 4), confirm our hypothesis. Moreover, in both cases, the explanatory 
capacity of the model is quite good, with an adjusted R
2 that exceeds 0.9, and the results are 
robust to the inclusion in the model of a wide set of controls. First of all, note that the Party × 
Election and Region × Election effects, included in all the equations, are jointly statistically 
significant and play a major role in increasing the explanatory capacity of the model. The 
inclusion of Party × Region × Election effects did not increase the explanatory capacity of the 
model significantly and, therefore, was discarded. Second, the lagged vote share and the 
average vote shares of the parties in the government are also responsible for this high 
explanatory capacity. These results suggest that the election results at the municipal level are 
explained mainly by the structural attachment of the voting population to certain parties 
(average vote share), by the persistence of these ideological attachments and other popularity 
shocks (lagged vote share) and by regional popularity shocks that affect the electoral prospects 
of each party differently (Party × Election + Region × Election effects). Third, there are also 
certain traits of the incumbent government that might be rewarded/ punished at the polls. The 
results suggest that coalition governments are punished, while first term governments are 
rewarded (see also Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a, for previous evidence of these effects). 
 
Fourth, the other controls (growth in unemployment, population and taxes) have the expected 
sign in all cases. In the case of unemployment, although the results suggest that its increase 
harms the re-election prospects of incumbents at all layers of government, this effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Population growth has a positive and significant 
impact on the vote for the municipal incumbent, while it is affected negatively by property tax 
increases, although these effects are only significant at the 90% level. These results are very 
similar to those obtained in previous studies (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 2007b). In 
the case of property taxes, these papers found a stronger and significant negative effect, but only 
  26after instrumenting this variable, something that we did not do here as it is not our main variable 
of interest. 
 
Finally, we made several robustness checks. First, we have re-estimated the equation by adding 
interactions between the rate of unemployment and population size dummies and the party 
dummies. The results suggest that left-wing parties typically have better results when 
unemployment shrinks but the standard errors are quite high; the results regarding population 
size interactions are quite difficult to interpret. Overall, all those interactions add very little 
explanatory power to the equation and do not have any influence on the grant coefficients, and 
so we decided not to report them. Second, we also have estimated a vote equation where the 
vote share of the incumbent has been transformed as  ) ( ~ 1
J J v v
− Φ = , ) (• Φ  standing for the 
standard normal distribution (see expression 5a). Although the point estimate of the coefficients 
is not directly comparable to that of the linear equation (5b), the results are qualitatively similar: 
grants to aligned municipalities have a positive effect on the vote and grants to unaligned 
municipalities do not bring any votes. Third, we have re-estimated the vote equation with 
different definitions of alignment: considering a government aligned also in those cases where 
the party at the municipal layer (either a single party or coalition leader) is a mere coalition 
partner at the upper layer (thus expanding the definition of alignment), considering also those 
cases where the party is a local partner (thus, further expanding our definition), and only 
considering as aligned those cases in which a single party fully controls both layers (thus 
restricting our definition). The results are practically indistinguishable from those presented 
here, and so any attempt at interpreting them would be mere speculation.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to test the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis which claims that 
grants assigned to municipalities controlled by co-partisans buy more votes than those assigned 
to municipalities governed by opposition parties. In order to do so, we use a rich Spanish 
database which provides information on the capital grants received by 617 municipalities during 
the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (i.e., Regional and Upper-
local) and municipal vote data on three electoral contests held at each of these layers during this 
period. Therefore, we have been able to estimate two different vote equations that analyse the 
effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the share of the vote obtained 
by the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. The results suggest that grants 
given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do 
not bring any votes.  
  27 
The implication of this result is, according to our theoretical model, that the grantee reaps as 
much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor. We believe that this result is 
quite plausible given that we are analyzing project grants in which, although the grantor acts as 
financial backer, considerable work is required from the grantee both during the allocation stage 
(i.e., project submissions) and subsequently during its implementation. It is common in this type 
of projects that the grantor makes efforts to communicate to the voters that he is the one actually 
paying for the infrastructure (e.g., trough the use of placards or by organizing an inauguration 
ceremony), but these efforts use to be matched by the grantee who uses similar strategies (e.g., 
appearances in the local media emphasizing their role in obtaining external funding). It is not 
strange, therefore, that the voter typically apportions credit equally to both parties, grantor and 
grantee. However, it is important to stress that our results cannot be generalized to all grants and 
neither to all countries. The feasibility to distribute grants according to their electoral 
productivity is conditioned to the institutional framework an on their design. 
 
Therefore, according to our results, the partisan use of grants has its roots in the low ability of 
the voter to properly assign credit to the different layers of government and this is caused at the 
end by an unclear division of responsibilities between layers and by the earmarked finance of 
projects which are the responsibility of local governments. This sort of ‘partial decentralization’, 
where upper-layers not only fund local services but also put many conditions on the use of 
funds (e.g., approve the projects), could lead to a dysfunctional working of federalism has been 
recently recognized by some scholars (see, e.g., Devajaran et al., 2007). These authors even 
suggest that ‘partial decentralization’ could foster rent-seeking. We have not gone so far in this 
paper, but acknowledge than in some stances earmarked financing could facilitate ‘partisan 
clientelism’ of the type described Weingast et al. (2006), since non-aligned municipalities could 
see its projects subsequently rejected by the grantor until opposition parties are replaced at the 
local election. It is our purpose to investigate this possibility in the future, trying to ask which of 
the two hypothesis (i.e., ‘differential productivity’ and ‘clientelism’) has more explanatory 
power and under which circumstances would each type of behavior be more prevalent. 
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